

E # 179

DOC 1632 A

Excerpt from Marquis Kido's Diary

1931

July 11 (Sat) - On the way home about 10 o'clock, I visited Mr. HARADA at his home. Heard the information that the Army during the past week had stiffened its attitude in regard to the reduction of the armaments and especially in regards to economizing which is the latest plan of the Finance Department. We are worried that the Army as a last resort might take further steps to appeal to the throne.

1931

July 13 (Monday) -- At noon, had lunch with Messrs. HARADA, TAKAGI, SAKAI and OKABE at Tokyo Club. Mr. HARADA reported to us that the Army was more unyielding than ever and that the War Minister is going to see the Emperor on the 14th or 15th. I thought that I should report this matter to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, and left Shinbashi at 2:25 for Kamakura to relay this message. Ordered to relay this message to the Grand Chamberlain in Hayama, I immediately left by automobile and called on the Grand Chamberlain SUZUKI at Chojaen. I relayed to him the message and the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal's view in regard to it and came home at 6:30.

1931

September 9 (Wednesday) - At 6:30 P.M., held a conference in respect of the present aspect of affairs, at the residence of Prince KONOYE, including the prince, ARIMA, OKAWA and myself. Mostly, ARIMA explained in details about the secret plot which had been planned by a certain group of militarists and the OKAWA's faction in the middle part of last March, by such connection as he had been requested to participate in executing the plot by OKAWA, Shumci through SHIMIZU.

"ARIMA. 'This plot has been suspended once. However, a thought of this kind will not disappear altogether, but will reappear whenever an opportunity presents itself, because the motives of planning this plot were

(1) that the permeation of Communism has been so noticeable recently that this country might fall into Communists' hands if the agitation was left unchecked.

(2) No movement will attain its object, unless it is carried out under the Imperial rule.

(3) Wherefore, the OKAWA's faction advocates Socialistic Nationalism under the Imperial rule and the establishment of an Autocratic government in place of the present political party system.

(4) A certain militarists' group has responded to this and shook hands with the OKAWA's faction for the purpose of creating such a Fascists' government as existing in Italy.' "

In view of the above reasons, we shall have to think up an adequate counter-measure. Especially, the Imperial Household should have full understanding of the situation and take necessary steps about it. We found the point of agreement in our opinions, and we arranged that we meet and discuss this matter as frequently as possible.

Document No. 1632-E

Excerpt from the Diary of Marquis KIDO

1931

September 12 (Sat.) -- At noon I met Mr. HARADA at Ginza Dining Hall and talked in detail about the latest under-handed movement of the Army.

1931

September 10 (Thurs.) -- Had lunch with Mr. OKABE, Mr. ODA and Mr. TANI, the head of the Asiatic Bureau, at Prince KONOYE's house. Mr. TANI told us about the China Affairs and gave his opinion. His opinion was that self defensive action might be unavoidable according to developments in the future. I agree with it, in general.

1931.

August 7 (Fri.) -- Came to Tokyo by electric car starting at 8.19 and went to see Mr. HARADA. I learned about the latest political conditions and especially of the plot to be carried out in Army circles during the middle of March. It is regrettable from the standpoint of control of our country that it is becoming very obvious that the Army will carry out a certain type of plot.

1. During the middle of March when the Parliamentary session was being held a plan was drafted at the official residence of War Minister to disrupt the Parliamentary session and bring about the political change by Major Generals KOISO, TATEKAWA and NINOMIYA as leaders with Lt. Cols. HASHIMOTO and SHIGEFUJI who would act at their beck and call. OKAWA, Shumei, stood between them, collaborating with Social Mass Party. They planned to send Lt. Col. SUZUKI to MORI of the SEIYUKAI party, conveying their plot confidentially. This was given up, however, by the advice of SUZUKI, who (entertained fears) for the sake of the Army. It could be guessed that UGAKI was at the back of the plot.
2. An association of research group of Manchurian and Mongolian questions was formed among a group of captains graduated recently from the Army Staff College and the above-mentioned Lt. Colonels HASHIMOTO and SHIGEFUJI were its backers.
3. The brains of the Army cannot check these kind of associations because they themselves planned such plots as mentioned above.
4. Recently the Army group has been getting very strong. There is a danger of strong antagonism between the civilians and the Army regarding drafting of the budget.

1931.

August 7 (Fri.) -- Came to Tokyo by electric car starting at 8.19 and went to see Mr. HARADA. I learned about the latest political conditions and especially of the plot to be carried out in Army circles during the middle of March. It is regrettable from the standpoint of control of our country that it is becoming very obvious that the Army will carry out a certain type of plot.

1. During the middle of March when the Parliamentary session was being held a plan was drafted at the official residence of War Minister to disrupt the Parliamentary session and bring about the political change by Major Generals KOISO, TATEKAWA and NINOMIYA as leaders with Lt. Cols. HASHIMOTO and SHIGEFUJI who would act at their beck and call. OKAWA, Shumei, stood between them, collaborating with Social Mass Party. They planned to send Lt. Col. SUZUKI to MORI of the SEIYUKAI party, conveying their plot confidentially. This was given up, however, by the advice of SUZUKI, who (entertained fears) for the sake of the Army. It could be guessed that UGAKI was at the back of the plot.
2. An association of research group of Manchurian and Mongolian questions was formed among a group of captains graduated recently from the Army Staff College and the above-mentioned Lt. Colonels HASHIMOTO and SHIGEFUJI were its backers.
3. The brains of the Army cannot check these kind of associations because they themselves planned such plots as mentioned above.
4. Recently the Army group has been getting very strong. There is a danger of strong antagonism between the civilians and the Army regarding drafting of the budget.

1931

August 12, (Wed.) -- 6 o'clock in the afternoon, I went to Baron HARADA's house. Had dinner with Prince KONOYE and Marquis INOUYE. We heard and studied the details of what Mr. HARADA had told me the other day about the under-handed activities of a section of the Army. The affair that made Mr. UGAKI the leader, was that of March 20. (x) certain SHIMIZU of Taikosha was supplied with thirty bombs (Those were only for use in maneuvers and were almost harmless). However, it was told that the bombs were taken back to the Army a month ago. It is a fact that because the plot was called off and to pay off the men that had been assembled, they collected ¥ 100,000 from among the Tokugawa nobles.

(x) The above-mentioned fact centering around Ugaki as the leader, is in regard to the occurrence of about March 20, when a certain -----

1931

Sept. 19 - At 1.30 the Prime Minister went to see the Emperor. I was told that our Army would not try to enlarge the situation but would stop any further action when it found itself in an advantageous position.

A telephone call came from Mr. HARADA telling me to meet at the official residence of the Minister of the Imperial Household, at 8.30.

The Minister of the Imperial Household, the Grand Chamberlain and Mr. HARADA were there. Mr. HARADA reported that he was called by the Prime Minister at about 6.30 and that he was asked about the state of affairs. He said that the Army's attitude was very strong. He added that in regard to the policies decided upon by the cabinet, the Premier seemed to be worrying because the Army was not driving it home thoroughly. The Premier, therefore, wanted to find the best way for controlling the Army. Some said that it might be best to ask for Prince KAN-IN's help, and the others said that they should ask the "GENRO" to stay in Tokyo. But I told them that the Premier should not depend on others in the solution of this situation at this critical time. I emphasized that there was no other alternative but for the cabinet to hold meetings repeatedly and for days, even if futile, and to indicate a firm opinion of its own for the unification of national opinion.

1931

September 23 (Wed.) -- At 2.00 p.m., attended tea party thrown for Gentlemen of the Press at KASUMIYAMA Club. Heard the course of events in the Manchurian Incident from HAYASHI, the head of Maintenance Bureau of the Department of War. However, as the cause of the railway explosion, the most important point of the whole affair was not explained clearly, I asked him the question. To this, he replied that he had not as yet received the report. It seems very strange to me. It is regrettable also, not to be posted and informed on this point, especially when people are talking with skepticism about the cause of this accident.

1931

Sept. 29 (Tues.) -- At 9 o'clock, I visited the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal at his official residence and reported what I had heard from HARADA last night; namely, what the Chief of the Army General Staff had told to the Premier, "Chances are the Army is compelled to send troops to the Yangtze River area. If this happens, he does not want the trouble regarding the reversion of Supreme Command--that is to say, the Government shall not interfere with the prerogative of the Supreme Command of the Army."

1931

Oct. 1 (Thurs.) -- At 4 o'clock, I visited Mr. HARADA. Also present were Prince KONOYE and Mr. SHIRATORI. We discussed and consulted upon the militarist's secret plot. The combination of the middle class elements of the Army is likely to be pretty tight, and the plan to break down the present political party system by means of effecting coup-d'etat and to administer national affairs under dictatorship has been made secretly ever since the 2nd year of Shwa era (1927). This is a serious problem indeed! It will be impossible for our statesmen and politicians to realize the danger of such a problem. It is very difficult to devise a counter measure. Anyway, it will be necessary to guide those militarists so that they won't cause the nation a serious damage and unnecessary sacrifice. It is a national calamity.

1931

Oct. 5 (Mon.) -- At 4.30 I visited Minister of the Imperial Household ICHIKI, at his official residence with Prince KONOYE. We discussed the Army's stubbornness and its intrigues. We gave him all information available and asked him to think up the best solution to this matter.

Document No. 1632-0      Excerpt from Marquis Kido's Diary.

1931

Oct. 6 (Tues.) -- The Prime Minister seemed to have talked about the serious situation to the Lord Keeper. The thing worrying the Prime Minister is that there is a risk of head-on collision with the Army about the question of the other party with whom to negotiate the Manchurian problem.

1931

Oct. 7 (Wed.) -- at 7 p. m. HARADA came to my house and we went to see Marquis INOUE at Uchidayama. We heard the opinions of the current problem of the Army Department from Lt. Colonel SUZUKI. Activities, in which Lt. Colonel SUZUKI takes part do not intend to carry out the national reformation immediately, but it is to save the situation if something does happen in the future, such as the outbreak of rebellion among the young officers. On the way home, I reported to Prince KONOYE about the above matter.

Document No. 1632-R     Excerpt from Marquis Kido's Diary.

1931

October 15 (Thurs.) -- At 1.30, I attended a tea party of the managing staffs of the newspapers. The Chief of the Information, SHIRATORI, Chief of the Maintenance Bureau, HAYASHI, and I had a conference on the situation.

HAYASHI, upon a premise that it was his own assumption, gave the following statement:

"It will be unwise to take time in solving the Manchurian question, from the Army's point of view in governing disciplines. It requires prompt solution. In order to reach prompt solution, it will be necessary to create a new regime in Manchuria. If the Central Authorities should give the agitators of the movement a tacit approval to do so, it will facilitate the solution of the problem."

He indicated by his statement the fact that the militarists still stuck to its plan to establish a new regime in Manchuria. On the other hand, it is said that the attitude of the militarists suddenly stiffened, taking advantage of the rumor that Count UCHIDA, the President of South Manchuria Railway Company, had the intention to settle the pending question by one effort--the establishment of a new regime in Manchuria.

Document No. 1632-V      Excerpt from Marquis Kido's Diary.

1931

September 21 (Mon.) -- At 9.30 I went to the office. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal came to Tokyo last night. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, the Grand Chamberlain and Vice-Grand Chamberlain, the head of the Army Aide-de-camp and I gathered in the room of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and conferred about the China and Manchukuo conflict.

Baron HARADA telephoned me from Kyoto asking if there were any further developments in the situation, and suggested that if the Emperor were to call Prince KAN-IN, we would discuss thoroughly the Prince's answer to the Emperor. HARADA phoned me again that evening. He transmitted Prince SAIONJI's words to be cautious about his (KANAYA) answer when KANAYA, the Chief of the General Staff would go to see the Emperor to explain why the Korean Army had advanced into Manchukuo without the Emperor's sanction.

At 7.30 p.m. after dinner, I visited the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal at his official residence and transmitted HARADA's telephonic message. On my way home, I stopped at TAKEUCHI's house. But I could not see him, as he was on a business trip.

199-4

Dec 1632 11.

1931

不戸公日記(昭和六年)より抜粋

七月十日

帰途下財頃原田君ヲ其宅訪フ

軍縮問題殊々最近、大藏省立案不節約問題。  
軍縮連シ陸軍方面此一週間以来二分二硬化セリト情報  
報ヲ聽ク、軍部公信本陣ヲ構へ上表方々一段落  
ニ至らずト直覺せし。

木戸侯日記(昭和六年三月) 檜木平

July 13/1931 B  
乙午東京俱樂部にて原田、高木、酒井、田部  
諸君と会食。原田君ヨリ軍部情報報  
依頼下りて破代也。口ヲ聽キ十四、五日頃陸軍軍  
大臣御詔勅奏請也。ト故に大臣御詔勅二つ  
報告次第、西華乃ト同心一旦歸宅、正二時  
三十多分前橋又子錦倉大臣方へ情  
報傳。其後常侍従長三傳。十一、有二付傷車  
于華山、三長者園二駕木侍従長傳  
聞。情報並右内大臣、意見及傳。言  
六時半歸京。

E. 179-B

Ex 179-7

Sept 9-1931 / 63 2 D

本日午時半より近衛師団司令官即ち西郷加八  
人部隊長の松原謙次大佐と有り、同部隊長は三月  
半旬計画を立てる軍部一行行江派下、該書の半  
世時同様に大川周明氏より清水了道の命令方より  
當ての關係上當時事情を詳細に説明あり。右  
事件は、前年正月の大正、即ち討憲、勅諭の「近時  
甚速宣戰」は、個人著者では、此後二年間は外國  
家族、経営、平中二月(此二月)二年間の間に、東洋舟  
室主戦、並びに如何化軍事、政治的動向等を了  
以深察、天皇主戦元老院議院、國家社會主義、官僚政  
府打倒、憲政改進等行はるゝ太川一派、主張する事  
事都之甚焉、伊太利、ノルマニア等諸國  
に實現已下太川一派下手に體現、其天皇主戦此思想  
八年有之謂也、又之に付し、機会、現れ化せ  
以て之對外政策考視、要すり得、宮中方面  
行天之手、策動、是行之宮中、理解す有  
之、且乎要事之、何事か、何事か、年段下講  
之、要すり、以下、意見一致、當得素人之手  
限、相互、合意、折合、下手の如く

木戸侯日記(昭和六年)四月、松原

33

Document No. 1632-E

EXH. 177-#D

Excerpt from the Diary of Marquis KIDO

1931

September 12 (Sat.) -- At noon I met Mr. HARADA at Ginza Dining Hall and talked in detail about the latest under-handed movement of the Army.

Sept. 179 - Q

1632 E  
Sept 12 — 1931

九月十二日

正午銀座食堂にて原田一會食  
軍部に追時、繁勵様より正午銀之説入

EX-119-WE

41

Document No. 1632-F

Excerpt from Marquis Kido's Diary

1931

September 10 (Thurs.) -- Had lunch with Mr. OKABE, Mr. ODA and Mr. TANI, the head of the Asiatic Bureau, at Prince MONOYE's house. Mr. TANI told us about the China Affairs and gave his opinion. His opinion was that self defensive action might be unavoidable according to developments in the future. I agree with it, in general.

乙 179-2

Sept 10-1931 1632F

近衛即三國會面而後並合了了  
局長上会會談山治氏對文問題之未定情  
益二之對之意見了聽了場合口子引下自備  
權，又轉取于歸竹化同氏，意見六大體  
指責餘十

木之候日記(昭和六年三月廿一)枝幹

不文日記(昭和六年)ノリ抜手

午前八時十九分電車ニテ上方百五十二原田君ヲ自宅訪問。最近、政情殊ニ吉ル三月半旬頃軍一部方面於行ハル策謀、就キ大体尤、如キ事実ヲ聽ク近來軍部一體、策動ヲ行コト、顯著トナリツワル國家、統制上ヨリ見ルモ遺憾ト

Doc. 1632 W.G.  
Aug. 7-1931

一三月中旬議會開會中、陸軍大臣官舎、於テ十  
礮建ツ二官歩將ヲ中心ニ橋本重蔵、西中佐ヲ其  
平尾ナリ大川周明ヲ其間ニ介在シ大衆黨ト結  
ヒ議會ヨリ混亂、陷レ政變ヲ來サシメントス。計画ノ  
ナレ、鈴木中佐ヲシテ政友會、森代其間意ヲ通  
セシムセシク同中佐、國軍、爲、諫止ヨリ漸々  
中止シタリト、事実、

宇垣陸相モ其背後ニヨリシモ一ト推セアル

一、最近陸軍大學卒業、大尉ヲ中心ニ満蒙問題研究、結社、前記橋本重蔵、西中佐ヲ裏面アリ

一、前記、策動等ナシタル關係上、陸軍主腦部ハ此、  
一種、結社等ヲ押忍テ能ハズ  
一、最近陸軍、結束益々強固トナリテ、予算編成ヲ中心ニ文武、対立激シスベ、慶アリ

6/179-5.

(Corrected copy)

Exhibit No. 179 F

Document No. 1632-G

Excerpt from Marquis Kido's Diary

1931.

August 7 (Fri.) -- Immediately upon arrival at Tokyo by the 8:19 a.m. electric car I called at Mr. Harada's residence. I learned about the following facts concerning the latest political conditions and especially of the plot that was to be carried out by military circles sometime during the middle of last March. It is regrettable from the standpoint of control of our nation that recently it is becoming very noticeable that the army makes certain types of plots.

1. During the middle of March when the Parliamentary session was being held a plan was drafted at the official residence of War Minister to disrupt the Parliamentary session and bring about the political change by Major Generals KOISO, TATEKAWA and NINOMIYA as leaders with Lt. Cols. HASHIMOTO and SHIGEFUJI who would act at their beck and call. OKAWA, Shumoi, stood between them, collaborating with Social Mass Party. They planned to send Lt. Col SUZUKI to MORI of the SEIYUKAI party, conveying their plot confidentially. This was given up, however, by the dissuasion of the said lieutenant colonel, in the interest of the army. It could be guessed that UGAKI was at the back of the plot.
2. An association of research group of Manchurian and Mongolian questions was formed among a group of captains graduated recently from the Army Staff College and the abovementioned Lt. Colonels HASHIMOTO and SHIGEFUJI were its backers.
3. The brains of the Army cannot check these kind of associations because they themselves planned such plots as mentioned above.
4. Recently the Army group has been getting very strong. There is a danger of strong antagonism between the civil and military (authorities) regarding drafting of the budget.

En 1796

## EXCERPT FROM MARQUIS KIDO'S DIARY

1931

August 12 (Wed) -- 6 o'clock in the afternoon, I went to Baron HARADA's house. Had dinner with Prince KONOYE and Marquis INOUYE. We heard and studied the details of what Mr. HARADA had told me the other day about the under-handed activities of a section of the Army. The affair that made Mr. UGAKI the leader, was that of March 20. (x) certain SHIMIZU of Taikosh was supplied with thirty bombs (These were only for use in maneuvers and were almost harmless). However, it was told that the bombs were taken back to the Army a month ago. It is a fact that because the plot was called off and to pay off the men that had been assembled, they collected ¥100,000 from among the Tokugawa nobles.

(x) The above-mentioned fact centering round UGAKI as the leader, is in regard to the occurrence of about March 20, when a certain . . .

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

五 199-9

Aug. 12 - 1931  
1632 H

不戸の日記(昭和六年)の概要

午後六時、厚田男爵一家、近衛公井一家と共に食事。先づ是日、鳴門市守田君より聽取也。陸軍第一師團、策動の手簡詳細。此事實今聽取所定久又宇垣氏、中心也。事實は三月三十日頃、出来事。于太行社清水某二條屋之演習用所を、一連の危害、毀滅し、効力六千キロ以下三十キロ強を給セシガル。約一ヶ月前、兩軍擇て取返し合ふ。又此計画、中止せし爲め本多大尉、之乃方ニ信託ノ十萬圓、重利一門、其後引省セリ。吾丈、事實人等。

木戸公日記(昭和六年)三月十九日

九月十九日  
午後一時半總理大臣於内閣遇入 時局之以上  
十九八ヶ擴大也我軍優勢時之此時之  
打切方針之進行不凡下下  
午後六時より上野長柄庵にて御飯、斯波高  
木、酒井佐木、松平、黒木内閣諸君ト會食、貴  
族院問題ヲ議論入  
原田君ヨリ電詔予八時半官内大臣官舍ニ參集  
十七八年十一月二十日寅半二時半起  
官内大臣侍従長原田君同席 原田君ヨリ本日  
午後六時半漫總理大臣呼心ヒ旅況聽取報  
言了り  
向軍部、態度ハ中央強硬ニシテ開議決宣言事  
項、実施二字不外先手軍部二方針不徹底  
ノ如キニテ天下ト百家憂心懊憹様子十  
何等力軍部統制、良弊ハナヤ等々諸君  
アリ開院官、努力ヲ及バズモ一法古蘇ハ

196.2.1

木戸公日記（昭和六年）ヨリ抜粋

Doc. 16327

元老、錦京ヲ求メテハ等々意見元老山ガ  
余以此難局ニ際し首相ガ之ヲ解決ニ半所  
謂他力本願十八面白カ云々問題ハ空山ノ幾  
度ニテモ亦何日三丁モ閣議ヲ反覆是閣催シテ  
國論統一ノ努力内閣自身確々心決ヘリ示  
ス外途ナシト信ムト主張入

No. 2

木戸公日記（昭和六年）三月廿二日

Doc. 16327

元老、歸京ヲ來メテハ等々、意見ニ云々方  
余以此、難局ニ際し首相ガ之ヲ解決ニシテ所  
謂他力本願十八面白カ云々問題ニ空シテ幾  
度ニモ亦何日三モ閣議ヲ反覆開催シテ  
國論統一ノ努力内閣自身確々決心ヲ示  
ス、外途ナシト信ムト主張入

Exh 179-I (Corrected copy)

Document No. 1632-J

Excerpt from Marquis Kido's Diary.

1931

Sept 22 (Tues.) -- At 1.30 I visited Mr. HARADA's house again. KONOYE, SAKAI, OKABE, and TAKAGI came there. Discussed and studied various things coming from various directions.

The determination of the Military circles towards Manchuria is so strong that it is feared that orders given by the central authorities may not be thoroughly understood.

The Emperor has expressed satisfaction and approval to the Prime Minister and the Minister of War for the governmental policy to strive not to extend further the Manchurian Incident. However, the Army is reported to have construed and to be indignant, that the Emperor's opinion had been so induced to form by his personal attendants,

In view of such circumstances, it was decided among us that the Emperor had better not say anything further about the Manchurian policy, unless he is necessitated to do so, and that the GENRO (Meining Prince SAIONJI) against whom the Army harbors antipathy, had better not make a trip to Tokyo unless there is an important change in the situation, because it would intensify the militarist's antipathy.

EVO. 19 P-5

32

Document No. 1632-I

Excerpt from Marquis Kido's Diary.

1931

Sept. 19 - At 1.30 the Prime Minister went to see the Emperor. I was told that our Army would not try to enlarge the situation but would stop any further action when it found itself in an advantageous position.

A telephone call came from Mr. HARADA telling me to meet at the official residence of the Minister of the Imperial Household, at 8.30.

The Minister of the Imperial Household, the Grand Chamberlain and Mr. HARADA were there. Mr. HARADA reported that he was called by the Prime Minister at about 6.30 and that he was asked about the state of affairs. He said that the Army's attitude was very strong. He added that in regard to the policies decided upon by the cabinet, the Premier seemed to be worrying because the Army was not driving it home thoroughly. The Premier, therefore, wanted to find the best way for controlling the Army. Some said that it might be best to ask for Prince KAN-IN's help, and the others said that they should ask the "GENRO" to stay in Tokyo. But I told them that the Premier should not depend on others in the solution of this situation at this critical time. I emphasized that there was no other alternative but for the cabinet to hold meetings repeatedly and for days, even if futile, and to indicate a firm opinion of its own for the unification of national opinion.

乙. 109-6

Doc. 1632 K

木戸公日記(昭和元年)三 挿序

午後二時より霞ヶ山會館にて予の新聞記者達と  
茶話會あり出席者林陸軍有志團長等  
今回事件經過を聽き肝心の餘波騒動  
詳細な情況不明に止む之を危惧せん本報報告  
到着七八十名(予議)奇怪至極十二月上  
不純な動機?云々之れ意外なる所詮兩派  
遺憾なり

500. 119-K

doc 1632L

Sept 29 - 1931

木戸公日記(昭和六年)より抜粋

九月十九日

午前九時内大臣ヲ官邸ニ訪問昨夜魚田ヨリ聽取  
多心絲謀總長、首相對入申入即ケ今後或、長  
江筋三本兵場合等モ豫想心得花テ又其場合  
統帥權問題、再び惹起せし精統帥權、參勤  
引政府於予干渉せむ様、セウシタ竹ヨ中心ニ時事  
問題ヲ報告入

6. 17A-7

1632 14

木戸公日記(昭和六年)ヨリ抜粋

四時三原田君ヲ訪向、近衛君、白鳥君も來訪。軍部、陰謀ニツキ言ナ持トヨリ相談。陸軍中堅分子、結束頗ル強ク。昭和二年頃ヨリ、計画ニテ政黨打破シ一縛アリケンタラアミヨリ國向政ヲ處理セムト、計画ナルリ如く、対易ナラサル問題ナリ。而レ此問題ハ現江、政治家連ハ到底アライベキモナフ結局之討ヘル方策ノ頗ル困難ナリ。也モ負モ如ヒ計画モ未得也ナハ回、根幹ヲ審スル所ノ直ツ餘計十無駄。ナキ称善道スル、要アリト思フ。眞難ナリ。

Gr. 179-17

Oct 5 - 1931  
14' 32: N

木戸公日記(昭和六年)三月夜草

午後四時半近衛公ト共ニ木宮内大臣于官舍訪問軍部、硬化黨謀等ニキ情報ヲ訪ニ善処ヲ希望入。

JP

1931

Oct. 5 (Mon.) -- At 4.30 I visited Minister of the Imperial Household ICHIKI, at his official residence with Prince KONOYE. We discussed the Army's stubbornness and its intrigues. We gave him all information available and asked him to think up the best solution to this matter.

乙. 179-16

Oct. 4 — 1931

木戸公日記(昭和六年)三  
核

總理の時局、憂慮すべき事情二半内大臣  
ニ詔じる様子ナリ總理の滿洲問題、支  
歩相半方ニシテ軍部ト正面衝突入ル  
廣東アルトロ最要憂慮せり様子ナリ

EXH# 179-R

34

Document No. 1632-Q      Excerpt from Marquis Kido's Diary.

1931

October 14 (Wed.) -- At noon I went to Count Tadamasa SAKAI's house and had a conference with Masatoku YASOUKA, Chokei OKABE, Manabu MATSUMOTO, Shigeru YOSHIDA, and Fumio GOTO regarding the current problems. According to Mr. YASUOKA, the plots of the Army are progressing rapidly and students and Ronins are participating in it. Something must be done regarding this matter, he said. Our opinion was that Shashokukai /TN. an association/ which had been previously planned by YASUCKA and others, should be materialized as a permanent counter measure.

109-P

1632 Q  
Oct 14-1931

木戸公日記(昭和六年)四月廿二日

正午酒呑伯(忠正)邸にて、宣西正當、武岡部長景、松本孚、吉田茂、後藤文太、諸君、食會。御馬走二十り、時事向題ヲ商議ス。宣西化、省見三司ハ最近軍部、第謀八益(盛平)アリ。浪人学生等モ日三日加久ワ、アリ。トカ討策ヲ講究サルカラズト云フナリ。同氏等、豫テ討否社稷大命相キハ恒久的、討罪上シテ実現スル、要ナリトコトニ一致ス。

乙. 199-4

1632 R  
Oct 1931

木戸公日記(昭和六年)ヨリ抜萃

林蔵局長へ假定、問題ト云フ前提アヘンタガ結果、  
滿洲問題、解決余リ、長ニカスルハ軍、統制規律  
トシカラ見テ不得策ニシテ早急に解決ヲ要スル事  
之が為ニ滿洲ニ新政権ヲ樹立セし、要アリ、而テ  
今日中央部ニ於テ之が樹立運動ニ暗黙、諒解ヲ顯  
ヒハ直ニ實現スルコトヲ得シト云フ謂子ニテ暗々、中ニ  
軍部ハ依然トテ滿洲ニ新政権ヲ樹立セシムト意  
(2) 有スルコトヲ示シタ

1632 Q

Oct 14 - 1936

8

179 R

木戸公日記(昭和六年)三月後半

正午酒井白雲三郎至! 家園正鶴代、國部長壽  
松本子、吉岡茂、後藤文夫、諸君上会に食事會、御馳  
走三十、時事問題ヲ協議、空襲令、意見交換八點近  
軍部、參謀、並、艦二十七之二浪人浮世繪、天保の御年  
少り少、アリ何とか討罪ヲ許せばかう天保二十九年  
同氏等、豫算計画也社稷會、如手八恒ら合的、討罪不  
立、浪人相立、要アリト、了二段入

EM 109-R

38

Document No. 1632-V Excerpt from Marquis Kido's Diary.

1931

September 21 (Mon.) -- At 9.30 I went to the office. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal came to Tokyo last night. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, the Grand Chamberlain and Vice-Grand Chamberlain, the head of the Army Aide-de-camp and I gathered in the room of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and conferred about the China and Manchukuo conflict.

Baron HARADA telephoned me from Kyoto asking if there were any further developments in the situation, and suggested that if the Emperor were to call Prince KAN-IN, we would discuss thoroughly the Prince's answer to the Emperor. HARADA phoned me again that evening. He transmitted Prince SAIONJI's words to be cautious about his (KANAYA) answer when KANAYA, the Chief of the General Staff would go to see the Emperor to explain why the Korean Army had advanced into Manchukuo without the Emperor's sanction.

At 7.30 p.m. after dinner, I visited the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal at his official residence and transmitted HARADA's telephonic message. On my way home, I stopped at TAKEUCHI's house. But I could not see him, as he was on a business trip.